




Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in
Listed French Companies
Dherment-Ferere, I.; Renneboog, L.D.R.
Publication date:
2000
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Dherment-Ferere, I., & Renneboog, L. D. R. (2000). Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large
Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-70). Finance.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





SHARE PRICE REACTIONS TO CEO
RESIGNATIONS AND LARGE SHAREHOLDER
MONITORING IN LISTED FRENCH COMPANIES
By Isabelle Dherment-Ferere and Luc Renneboog
August 2000
ISSN 0924-7815
Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations
and




* Department of Economics, University of Toulon and Institute of Business Administration
(IAE-CEROG), University of Aix-en-Provence (Aix-Marseille III).
** Department of Finance and CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Marc Goergen, Joe McCahery, Foort Hamelinck for valuable comments and
advice. The usual disclaimer applies.
Keywords : corporate governance, managerial disciplining, ownership structure, CEO succession, event study
JEL classification : G3 (Corporate finance and governance), G32 (financial policy; capital and ownership
structure),
1
Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations
and
Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies.
Abstract:
This study has analysed the share price reactions to changes in top management. A distinction was made among
different types of CEO turnover: forced resignation, voluntary departures and age-related retirements. The
announcement of a forced CEO resignation is hailed favourably by the market with a small but significantly
positive abnormal return of 0.5%. The market may have anticipated the forced turnover since the abnormal
return over a one-month period prior to the turnover amounts to 6%. Whereas voluntary resignations do not
cause a price reactions, age-related turnover triggers a small negative price reaction. Subsequently, a more
detailed classification of the change of top management was made based on the background of the successor (an
internal versus external candidate), on the size of the corporation and the degree of corporate diversification.
Expectedly, the nomination of an external manager following the performance-related forced resignation of a
CEO causes a strong increase in abnormal returns of more than 2%. The cumulative abnormal return of an
internal CEO promotion in a poorly performing firms drops by almost 1% on the day of the announcement.
Presumably, this is because the internal manager is held (partially) responsible for past poor performance. In
companies with good past performance and with internal succession, there is a price decline, but this is not
statistically significant.
The paper also analysed which corporate governance mechanisms are responsible for forced CEO turnover. A
logit regression which accounted for time and industry specific fixed effects did not reveal a relation between
performance and turnover. Furthermore, institutional investors, banks and the government do not seem to
provoke CEO departures even if they own large blocks of equity. We did not find evidence that the government
exerts control in the companies in which it holds majority shareholdings. In contrast, when industrial companies
are major owners, there is evidence that forced turnover is facilitated. It also seems that it is easier to remove
management in smaller companies than in larger ones. On the part of holding companies, there is only some
evidence that they take a monitoring role in the case of other listed holding companies. No correlation was
discovered between the degree of leverage and forced CEOs departures, although CEO turnover is facilitated if
creditors have their own representatives on the board. Likewise, a high proportion of shareholder representatives
on the board leads to a higher probability of forced CEO resignations. However, this probability decreases when
the founding family is represented by one or more (executive) directors.
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1. Introduction.
Throughout changing economic conditions and business cycles, managerial quality is
maintained by the intervention of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.
Supervision by the board of directors, intervention by large shareholders, discipline from debt
markets, competitive pressure from product markets control managerial behaviour. In some
cases, when insufficient monitoring or managerial entrenchment has insulated management
and when corporate performance has declined, markets react favourably to the CEO
departures. In this study we investigate whether forced CEO dismissal triggers positive
abnormal returns in listed French companies. Voluntary CEO departures or unexpected
deaths of CEOs may entail a loss of human capital to the firm. Hence, we also analyse
whether negative abnormal returns can expected in these cases. However, these market
reactions may be dimmed or intensified depending on the qualities of the CEO’s successor
and corporate characteristics. For example, following poor performance, an external CEO
may be hailed more favourably by the market in contrast to an internal successor who may be
identified with past corporate underperformance.
This study does not only does with price reactions after the a change in top management, but
also investigates whether or not specific corporate governance mechanisms are involved in
bringing about CEO departures. Therefore, we investigate the role of holding companies (the
dominating large shareholders), industrial companies, families, institutions and the
government in exerting corporate control. This study contributes to the corporate governance
literature as, so far, hardly any empirical research was performed for French companies. In
the remainder of this section we formulate the propositions and embed them in the literature.
1.1. Market reactions to forced managerial resignations.
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory highlighted that managers may seek
maximisation of their own utility curve at the detriment of corporate value. Remuneration
contracts may reduce conflicts of interest if performance-related contracts can focus
managers’ attention on the corporate value drivers. However, in contrast to Anglo-American
countries, remuneration contracts on the basis of pay-for-performance are not yet as
widespread in Continental Europe. Hence, as performance related contracts are rare, bad
corporate performance, resulting from the non-alignment of managerial objectives and
corporate goals or from low adaptability of managerial skills to a changing economic
climate, often leaves the shareholders no alternative but to substitute incumbent
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management. Forced managerial turnover is expected to lead to significant share price
increases (proposition 1), even though the following costs have been incorporated: the
search and hiring costs of new management (Walsh and Seward 1990), the costs of breaking
the contract with the fired manager (Knoeber 1986) and the loss of company-specific human
capital.
The first event studies investigating the price impact of forced managerial turnover in the US
(e.g. Furtado and Rozeff 1987) reveal a positive but not statistically significant price increase.
Worell et al. (1993) confirm a price increase of 2.3% but their results are statistically
significant at the 1% level provided that the managerial resignation announcement includes
the nomination of a successor.1 The degree of price reaction also depends on the presence of
internal monitoring mechanisms in the study by Weisbach (1988): there is no wealth impact if
the managerial resignation takes place in a company of which the board is dominated by
executive directors. However, top management substitution leads to a significantly positive
price increase when the majority of the board consists of external independent directors.
Denis and Denis (1995) study 69 forced resignations and find that the dismissal of
underperforming management is greeted with relief by the market. There is a positive market
reaction of 2.25% on the announcement day for companies which experienced a fall in
performance over a three-year period prior to the managerial change.
However, the findings on forced managerial resignations are not unambiguous. Warner et al.
(1988) uncover significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns of –4.3% subsequent to
forced turnover (in the period of 5 to 30 days following the dismissal). This negative market
reaction is explained by an information effect which masks the real impact of forced turnover
on shareholder wealth: forced turnover may signal poor current and future performance which
had not yet been uncovered nor anticipated by the market. Mahajan and Lummer (1993)
confirm a (weakly) significant negative cumulative abnormal return measured over a two day
period (the day before and the day of the announcement) for US companies. Whereas the
studies described above are about US companies, Pige (1994) does not discover any such
relations for a small sample of French companies.
                                                       
1 They find a 2.3% price increase (significant at the 1%-level) over the period [+1 day ;+30 days] if the
announcement of the CEO departure (day 0) coincides with that of the nomination of a new CEO. The share
price only increases by 2% (significance within the 10%-level) over the period [+1 day ;+30 days] if the
departure and nomination announcements do not coincide. The fact that a resignation was expected by the
market can be deduced from a price increase of 11% (significance of  5%) over a 30-day period prior to the
CEO’s resignation.
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1.2. Market reactions to the death of the CEO.
Making abstraction of corporate performance, one would expect that the unanticipated death
of the CEO would trigger a negative price reaction (proposition 2) since the company faces a
loss in human capital which may have been company-specific. Johnson et al. (1985) do not
detect any significant share price reaction around the announcement date, but discover
increased volatility of abnormal returns subsequent to the announcement period. Worrell et al.
(1993) reveal that the market reacts more negatively when the death of a CEO occurs
suddenly compared to the cases in which the CEO dies after an illness, which provides some
support for the informational efficiency of equity markets. Etebari et al. (1987) confirm the
negative relation between CEO death and cumulative abnormal returns, but they find - after
splitting the sample of deaths according to the cause of death (hearth attacks, accidents or
suicides) – that accidents trigger significant positive market reactions of 8.25% over a 6 week
window (symmetrically around the event day). This finding may result from the fact that
CEOs may be entrenched – perhaps due to a long tenure with positive track record or due to a
substantial ownership stake - and are difficult to dismiss even in the wake of poor
performance.
1.3. Market reactions to non-conflictual resignations and retirements by top managers.
As retirements at the normal retirement age can usually be well anticipated, there is no reason
that the announcement of a retirement would cause a price reaction (proposition 3). On the
other hand, a non-conflictual resignation prior to retirement age may create a negative price
reaction if the company loses valuable company specific human capital (proposition 4). The
wealth effects of non-conflictual resignations were investigated in French and US companies
by Hubler and Schmidt (1996) and Mahajan and Lummer (1993), respectively. Both studies
reveal that the announcement of an executive director leaving the company on a non-
conflictual basis coincides with a negative cumulative abnormal return (significant in the
former, not significant in the latter). Still, the Mahajan and Lummer-study shows that there is
a (significant) positive share price change when a CEO steps down but remains on the board
as a director or when an executive director relinquishes his or her function but maintains a
managerial role within the firm.
The findings on market reactions to age-related retirements are in line with the expectations:
Furtado (1985), Beatty an Zajac (1987), Weisbach (1988) Mahajan and Lummer (1993) show
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that there are no price reactions. Exceptional are the results of Denis and Denis (1995) who
uncover a small but positive significant abnormal return of 0.6%. Presumably, the market
reacts with relief as, in the US, some directors stay on the board beyond the retirement age of
65.
1.4. The choice of a successor.
Most event studies test hypotheses based on the reasons why top management is substituted
but do not consider the price impact related to the qualities of newly hired or promoted
management. For example, the market may react differently depending on whether or not an
internal candidate is nominated as CEO. Promoting internal candidates may hold two
advantages: they may have (i) better company-specific process- and technological
knowledge, clearer insights in products, markets and competition, and a closer relation with
clients and (ii) social networks via which they acquire specific internal information. However,
if a radical break with an existing strategy is essential, an external successor may be preferred
as he may bring about change and revived creativity. The choice of a new CEO may also
depend on corporate characteristics such as performance, corporate size and the degree of
diversity of corporate activities. These characteristics may dim or amplify the price reactions
to the different types of CEO departures described above. Persistent poor corporate
performance leads to higher CEO dismissal as found by e.g. Franks, Mayer and Renneboog
(1998). As the CEO and his management team is responsible for poor performance, external
succession - especially following forced turnover - is expected to trigger a positive market
price reaction whereas internal promotion following poor performance may not be regarded
favourably by the market (proposition 5a). In well performing companies, internal succession
(after non-conflictual turnover) is less costly than external CEO succession. This implies that
the expected negative price reaction after internal succession may be less substantial than
after external succession (proposition 5b).
For large companies, it may be relatively less costly to nominate an internal successor than
for small companies because large companies usually have a pool of potential successors.
Hence, in the absence of poor performance, internal succession (after non-conflictual
turnover) may cause less strongly negative reactions in larger companies than in smaller ones
(proposition 6a) (Furtado and Rozeff 1987). If the need for new managerial skills is essential,
external succession will cause a larger positive market reaction in smaller companies as it is
easier to refocus the strategy of such firms (proposition 6b). The market reaction to a new top
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manager may also depend upon the industry in which a company operates. If the company is
diversified and operates in several unrelated industries, the value of the human capital of a
new top manager can be assessed with less precision than in undiversified companies. Hence,
external succession may trigger a stronger price reaction2 in a diversified company compared
to undiversified firms (proposition 7), because a new external manager may bring about
higher value added in diversified firms (Parrino 1997).
1.5. Corporate governance mechanisms.
As the CEO is ultimately responsible for the corporate performance, disciplinary actions are to
be expected as a result of poor share price and accounting returns if an efficient corporate
governance policy is exerted. Both the share price return and accounting performance portray a
myopic view of the true value of managerial skills reflected by corporate performance. The
relation between executive director or CEO resignations and share price performance may be
weaker because share prices already incorporate market expectations regarding managerial
replacement. On the other hand, accounting data can be manipulated (temporarily) by the
choice of accounting policies (Teoh et al. 1998). Therefore, the impact of both share price
returns, and levels of and changes in operating and net accounting earnings on turnover are to
be analysed.
A balanced board including both executives and non-executives reduces the agency costs and
potential conflicts among decision makers and residual risk bearers. Non-executives are not
only legally bound to monitor given their fiduciary duty, but they also often represent the
large shareholders in an equity market with strong ownership concentration such as in France
(Becht and Mayer 2000). Furthermore, non-executives have incentives to develop a
reputation as monitors as they face an external labour market which provides some form of
disciplining for passive leadership. Separating the roles of CEO and non-executive chairman
is also considered to be a strengthening factor of the board’s monitoring ability since a non-
executive chairman ensures more independence from management. Such recommendations
have been included over the past few years into several ‘codes of best practice’ such as the
Cadbury Report in 1992 in the UK, the Dutch Peters Committee code in 1996 and the Belgian
Commission of Banking and Finance code in 1998 (Goergen and Renneboog 2001). In
contrast, French corporate law states that the chairman of the board of directors needs to
assume the task of general management (‘doit assumer la direction générale de la société’),
                                                       
2 Price reactions will be less strongly negative after non-conflictual turnover and less strongly positive after
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but also that two managing directors can help him in this task. In 83% of listed public limited
corporations (sociétés anonymes, SA’s), the functions of chairman of the board and of the
CEO are combined by one person (Dherment 1996).3 The first French proposal of a corporate
governance code by the Viénot Commission in 1995 did not follow the international
consensus of appointing non-executive chairmen. This may be explained by the fact that the
Viénot committee was composed of Chairmen/CEO’s of listed corporations. The second
Viénot report of July 1999 tones down its earlier conviction and suggests the option to
introduce unitary or dual control4.
The incentives to monitor and correct managerial failure depend on whether the amount of
equity held by a shareholder (group) is large enough to internalise the costs of corporate control
(Grossman and Hart 1988). Moreover, specific classes of owners may value control differently.
This is reflected in the differences in control premium by category of owner because the
additional compensation and perquisites the controlling security holders can accord themselves
may differ across categories of shareholders. (Financial) holding companies are prevalent in
France and their private benefits and reasons for control accumulation are manifold: capturing
tax reductions by facilitating intercompany transfers and reducing transaction costs by offering
economies of scale or by supplying internal sources of funds (Banerjee et al. 1997). Likewise,
corporate shareholders may hold substantial share stakes in companies of a supplier or customer
in order to influence and/or capitalise on their strategic decisions (Johnson et al. 2000).
Financial institutions are often controlled by a holding company which also holds equity in the
target firms. Consequently, the interests of a financial institution as a creditor and as an equity
holder may diverge, such that in order to avoid conflicts of interest, this category of shareholder
is not expected to actively monitor (Renneboog 2000). Therefore, a positive relation is expected
between turnover and the equity stake held by holding companies, industrial and commercial
firms, individuals and families and no relation between turnover and institutional ownership
concentration (proposition 8).
Contrary to Anglo-American countries, ownership structures in France are usually complex and
pyramidal, and are constructed for reasons of control leverage (Wymeersch, 1994). Therefore,
decisions about disciplining management may not be taken by direct investors but rather by the
                                                                                                                                                                            
conflictual turnover.
3 In ‘sociétés à directoire’, a separation between the functions of CEO and chairman of the board is obligatory.
4 The Vienot report states that ‘le comité est favorable à l’introduction en droit français d’une option ouvrant au
Conseil d’administration le choix entre le cumul ou la dissociation des fonctions de président et de directeur
général’.
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ultimate shareholders who control the share stakes directly or through multiple tiers of
ownership. Similarly, monitoring of Belgian listed firms is not performed by intermediate
holding companies which are investment vehicles of controlling industrial companies or
individuals and families, but by these industrial companies and families themselves (Goergen
and Renneboog 2000) (proposition 9). When performance is poor, this may not only be the
result of bad management but also of a breakdown in corporate control. Consequently, a
(partial) corporate control market may arise as shareholders with little monitoring ability sell
substantial share stakes to monitors aiming to improve poor corporate performance. Bolton and
von Thadden (1998) point out that equity concentration embeds state-contingent control. If the
new shareholders replace low quality monitors, stronger disciplining of the incumbent
management may be expected (see Burkart et al. 1997).
When high leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy, close creditor monitoring may be
expected. Thus, setting a high capital gearing amounts to the creation of a bonding mechanism
for management (Aghion and Bolton 1992) and high turnover is expected to be positively
related to high gearing (proposition 10). Denis and Denis (1993) show that creditor monitoring
(measured by high leverage) combined with managerial ownership improves shareholder
returns.
In the remainder of this study, we investigate how the resignation of top managers in French
companies is received by the market. To summarise, we expect (i) an immediate positive
price increase at the announcement of forced dismissals, (ii) a negative price change
coinciding with non-conflictual resignations and with CEO departures due to illness or
decease and (iii) no market reaction at age-related retirements. CEO departure usually
coincides with the nomination of a new CEO and the choice between internal and external
succession may depend on corporate characteristics such as corporate size, sector
homogeneity and past corporate performance. We investigate whether these characteristics
have a bearing on relations (i) to (iii). In section 2, the sample selection is described and the
data sources and variables are disclosed. Section 3 discusses the results of the event studies.
In section 4, we also investigate whether top management turnover is related to ownership
and debt structure and internal corporate control mechanisms. Section 5 concludes.
2.  Data and Methodology.
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2.1 Sample selection and description of data sources and of variables.
The sample consists of 235 companies which experienced a change or their CEO (Président
Directeur Général) during at least one of the years in the period 1988-1992 and were listed
on the First Market the Paris Stock Exchange5. Over the five year period, 325 changes of
CEO were recorded for the 235 listed companies. Incomplete data on share prices and
undisclosed reasons for turnover reduced the number of companies to 207 (and to 277 CEO
changes).
Information about the board of directors and the resignation of directors was collected from
several sources. The database of the Banque de France contains for each director of a listed
company, the name, date of birth, dates of nomination to and resignation from the board. The
information concerning changes in the positions of CEO were verified with data from
l’Annuaire des Sociétés Cotées Desfossés (Dafsa-Desfossés). In order to collect
announcement dates, a press search was performed using the newspaper Les Echos, the most
important economic French journal. Les Echos contains a special section with new
nominations of managers and directors. The findings were double checked with information
from La Tribune Desfossés. In this press search, the following information was collected: the
reasons given for the CEO departure, the controlling mechanism that intervened to remove a
top manager and the number of directors departing along with the CEO. In addition to the
announcement date of the resignation, other market sensitive information released close to the
same date was also collected to disentangle the pure informational effect of the resignation.
Distinguishing among forced and non-conflictual resignations is difficult as euphemistic
terms are often used to mask the dismissal or no reasons are given. We consider as forced
resignations those cases where the CEO departure resulted from the non-renewal of the CEOs
mandate as a director and from the formal CEO dismissal as reported in the database of the
Banque de France (BdF). This information was supplemented with data from Les Echos:
although some resignations are classified as voluntary in the BdF-database, they were
considered as forced if a press article alluded to a conflict (e.g. departure following a change
in control, conflict with shareholders or the board of directors or another member of the
management team, difference in strategic views, etc.). The sample of non-conflictual
resignations includes departures where the CEO has taken the initiative and for which there
                                                       
5 The First Market or the Official Market consists of two markets: (1) Monthly settlement market (RM,
règlement mensuel) with 190 French stocks and 90 foreign ones and (2) cash market with 260 French stocks and
110 foreign ones (with a transaction volume 25 times lower than that of the RM).
10
are no press articles suggesting a conflict. This category of non-conflictual resignations may
also include departures due to illness or decease. Hence, we are relatively certain that the
subsample of forced turnover consists of turnover due to conflicts. However, the sample with
non-conflictual turnover which consists of voluntary resignations, may also contain some
case of forced turnover due to poor or uninformative disclosure of the reasons for CEO
departure. A third category of CEO departures consists of age-related retirements. Data on
new corporate destinations of leaving directors and on the professional origins of nominated
directors were collected from the guide Who’s Who. This source allows us to distinguish
between internal and external promotions to the board. We consider an external nomination to
have taken place when an outsider was nominated to the board less than one year prior to his
or her promotion to CEO.
In the annual reports of 207 French companies over the period 1988-92, 277 CEO
resignations were identified. In 38% of these CEO departures, part of the management team
left the firm along with the CEO. Table 1 shows that the BdF database reports 242 CEO
changes whereas the financial press (the financial paper Les Echos) only reports 128 cases.
17% of the CEO turnover was age-related retirement and 7% of the resignations were caused
by death or illness. Conflicts with the board of directors, the shareholders or other members
of the management committee resulted in forced turnover in 10% of all the CEO departures,
whereas in 20% there was no sign of conflict with 13% of the CEOs invoking personal
reasons and 7% leaving to pursue other professional opportunities. Still, such voluntary
resignations may still have been the consequence of undisclosed managerial disciplining.
Table 1 also exhibits the differences in classifying the reasons of resignation between the BdF
and the financial press. In 45% of the CEO departures mentioned in the financial press no
reason for departure was given and the cases classified as ‘dismissals’ in the BdF database
appeared to be a category in which departures for a variety of reasons were amalgamated.
Consequently, only 92 CEO departures could be classified with almost complete certainty
into one of the following categories (table 2): forced turnover (37 cases), non-conflictual
resignations (34 cases) and age-related retirements (21 cases). It is these cases which are
included in the event studies. It is these 92 cases which will be used in the event study
analysis of sections 3.1 and 3.2 and the share price reaction model of section 3.3. In the CEO
disciplining logit model of section 4, all data are included; if no reason is provided in the
financial press or BdF database the turnover is assumed to be conflictual.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
11
Company characteristics such as industrial sector, ownership structure, capital structure,
market capitalisation, number of employees, accounting data, were collected from the
DAFSA fiches (1987-93). Share price and dividend pay-out data were collected from the
database FININFO which contains the daily closing prices for the French market indices
CAC40 and SBF, for the sector indices and for all listed companies for the period 1988-92.
The interest rate on short term government bonds is used as a proxy for the riskfree rate and
collected from the Statistiques Annuelles de la Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF).
Corporate size was measured by market capitalisation, total sales, total assets and total
number of employees.6 The following performance measures prior to the board turnover were
chosen: ROE (on market and book value basis), market adjusted returns, Marris ratio,
Treynor ratio, Tobin’s Q for the year of turnover and one and two years prior. In addition,
these performance variables were corrected for industry effects by taking the deviation from
the industry averages.
Companies are considered to be sector-homogeneous when their markets, technologies and
structures are similar. To determine sector-homogeneity, the average of the partial correlation
coefficients between the returns of companies and that of their industrial sector is calculated
by means of a multiple regression with corporate return as the dependent variable and with
the returns of the market index and of the industrial sectors as independent variables. The
partial correlation coefficient (Cp) measures the percentage of the return variation of the
company explained by variation in sector returns: Cp = (β/SE) / [(β/SE)2 + (n-k-1)]1/2 with β
representing the correlation of the corporate return with the industry return, SE the standard
error of the estimated β, n the number of observations, and k the number of independent
variables.
2.2 Methodology.
2.2.1. Abnormal return calculation and event studies.
In order to measure the abnormal return of share i at day t, the market and risk adjusted return
is calculated which assumes that a version of the CAPM generates expected returns. For
example, the Treynor-Sharpe-Lintner model, E(Ri,t)= E(RF,t)+βi[E(Rm,t)-E(RF,t)], generates a
return for every share i with RF,t being the return of a risk free asset and Rm,t being the return
                                                       
6 In the regressions, the logarithm of the consolidated data is included.
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of the market portfolio. The abnormal return ARi,t is the difference between the (logarithmic)
nominal return and the expected return, Ri,t-E(Ri,t). Betas were estimated with daily returns
over a period of 260 to 60 days prior to the announcement day 0. As the companies in our
sample are liquid companies listed on the ‘first market’, a correction for thin trading was
deemed not necessary.
To test whether the equally weighted arithmetic average of the abnormal returns ( tAR ) is
statistically different from zero, the following test-statistics are used. N stands for the number
of events, S stands for the standard deviation of the cross-sectional average abnormal returns,
(T-τ) is the number of (trading) days over which the standard deviation of the cross-sectional
mean abnormal returns are calculated. If the abnormal returns have an independent and
identical distribution, the test-statistic has a Student T-distribution.









































abnormal returns in the cross section of shares are from independent and identically
distributed samples from a distribution with finite variance, the central limit theorem shows
number of shares increases. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) show that, for small samples of
5 or 10 shares, the distribution of abnormal returns deviates from the normal distribution, but
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the non-normality of daily returns does not have a significant impact on the event study
methodology.
2.2.2. Price reaction regression models.
In order to explain the market price reaction at the announcement the voluntary or forced CEO
turnover (measured by a 2-day abnormal return around the announcement day), the regression
model presented in table 2 is estimated. The cases of turnover for which no unambiguous
reason could be determined were excluded. The explanatory variables are corporate
performance, size, sector homogeneity of the firm, a dummy variable indicating internal
succession (a CEO promoted from the pool of managers of the firm) or external succession
(CEO is recruited externally), and a dummy variable reflecting the type of resignation (forced
versus voluntary departure). Table 1 also shows the reduced regression models for the specific
combinations of forced/voluntary turnover with internal/external succession. For example, the
degree to which the price reaction depends on past corporate performance and on the fact that
the CEO was forced to resign while an external candidate was nominated, can be computed by
summing up the parameter estimates βi2, βi6 and βi8. The coefficient βi2 by itself reflects the
relation between the market price reaction and past performance when the CEO leaves
voluntary and is succeeded by an internal CEO.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
2.2.3. Disciplining of top management.
Logit regressions with panel data over the period 1988-92 whereby every year represents an
individual observation are estimated to determine whether or not conflictual CEO turnover
(dummy=1) is initiated by concentrated ownership or another monitoring mechanism. Industry
and time specific fixed effects models are estimated with the executive board turnover as an
independent variable. With regard to ownership concentration, a distinction is made among
holding companies, institutions, industrial companies, government controlled investment
agencies, and individuals and families. Variables capturing past corporate performance, the
degree of leverage and board characteristics such as board size, the percentage of non-
executives, the separation of CEO and chairman, the percentage of directors representing
shareholders, debtholders and founders are also included. The robustness of the models is tested
by including corporate dummies and by including taking innovations to remove firm-specific
effects. In order to address the endogeneity problems lagged data for ownership, performance
and debt policy were included in the models.
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The relation between board restructuring, performance, ownership, leverage, board structure is
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τi,q * year   + εi,t Size, industry and time dummies
i = company, t = year, k=type of board restructuring, l = classes of owner, n= number of board composition
variables, p=number of industries, q is number of years.
- Board restructuring: a dummy variable = 1 when the CEO is forced to resign, and =0 if there
is no CEO departure or if the CEO’s departure is voluntary.
- PERF = performance variable measured by lagged (1) market adjusted returns, (2) level of
ROE (earnings defined as earnings after tax), (3) changes in ROE, (4) level of ROA (earnings
defined as operating earnings), (5) changes in ROA, (6) level of Tobin’s Q (market value of
assets / book value of net assets), (7) changes in Tobin’s Q.
- CONC = ownership concentration (in %) by class of owner: (i) holding companies, (ii) banks,
(iii) institutional investors (pension funds, investment funds, funds managed by insurance
companies), (iv) industrial and commercial companies, (v) families and individual investors,
not related to a director (vi) federal or regional authorities, (viii) executive directors and
families, (ix) non-executive directors and families, (x) employees. Both the percentages of
ownership by category of owner and the percentage held by the largest shareholder are included
(in separate regressions). Both direct shareholdings by category of owner are included as are the
direct shareholdings reclassified into the categories of owner based on the category of the
ultimate (reference) shareholder (in separate regressions).
- DEBT = debt/total assets.
- BOARD = board composition (% of non-executive directors), separation of the functions of
CEO and chairman (1=no separation), percentage of directors representing the founding family,
percentage of directors representing the debtholders, percentage of directors representing the
shareholders.
- SIZE = logarithm of total assets or of total employees.
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- Leg.form. = Legal Form : Dummy is 0 if company is a Société Anonyme, is 1 if company is
a Société Anonyme à Directoire, is 2 if company is a Société à Commandite par Actions.
- Stock Exch. = Type of stock exchange: dummy =0 if share is listed on the reglement mensuel
(most liquid market) and 0 if listed on the cash market (CPT)
3. Market reactions to changes in top management.
3.1. Share price movements at announcement of CEO resignations: event study results.
Of all the CEOs who relinquished their functions, the destination of 124 could be traced: 48
moved to another firm, whereas 61 remained employed by the same company or became non-
executive directors and 15 joined a firm belonging to the same corporate group. 98% of the
announcements of CEO departures included the nomination of a successor. Contrary to the
recommendations of good corporate governance in most countries, the functions of CEO and
Chairman of the board are not separated in 84% of our sample.
Table 3 shows the market price reactions (cumulative abnormal returns) surrounding the
announcement of 92 CEO resignations which could be unambiguously classified into the
following categories - voluntary resignation, forced turnover and age-related retirement –
which. Panel A reveals that non-conflictual CEO departures, including voluntary resignations
as well as deaths and illness related resignations, do not trigger any significant market price
reaction. Thus, there is no evidence that propositions 2 and 4, which state that the loss of the
human capital coincides with the non-conflictual CEO departure (including death and illness
of CEOs), creates negative price pressure. In contrast, proposition 1, which states that forced
turnover increases shareholder wealth, is sustained. Panel B shows that, for the event window
of 20 days around the announcement day, share prices increase by almost 0.5% within the 2%
level of statistical significance. Panel D investigates whether there is a difference in price
reaction between announcements of non-conflictual and forced turnover: the market reacts
significantly and positively to forced turnover in comparison with the announcement of non-
conflictual departure. Surprisingly, the announcement of an age-related retirement triggers a
negative price reaction (panel C), which contradicts proposal 3. In table 3, the market price
reaction takes place not on the announcement date itself but over a period of 20 days around
day 0. This may result from the fact that in the case of conflicts or poor performance, the
market may have anticipated a resignation, which can also be observed in figure 1 where the
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cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) drift upwards in the period prior to the
announcement.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3.2. Share price movements at CEO succession announcement of: event study results.
Market reactions to changes in CEO and to internal or external promotions are expected to
depend on past corporate performance. External CEO succession triggers stronger positive
price reactions than internal succession if the renouncing management’s performance,
reflected in past corporate performance, was unsatisfactory (proposition 5a). If, on the
contrary, past corporate performance was sound, internal promotion may create a less
negative price reaction as the loss of company-specific human capital at the departure of the
CEO is less (proposition 5b). In figure 2a, the wealth effect of the nomination of an external
CEO is depicted for poorly performing companies7: while none of the abnormal returns prior
to the announcement dates are statistically significant, the CAAR increases at the
announcement by more than 2% to 2.86%. Figure 2b shows that in poorly performing
companies with internal CEO succession, the CAAR is negative up to 10 days prior to the
announcement, then becomes positive, but drops by almost 1% on the day of the
announcement. All abnormal returns are not statistically significant apart from the price
decline on the announcement day. These findings corroborate proposition 5a: in poorly
performing companies, the nomination of an external CEO is greeted by the markets with a
price increase. However, in poorly performing companies with an internal CEO promotion,
the CAAR rises prior to the announcement presumably in anticipation to the removal of the
incumbent CEO who is held responsible for the corporate performance. The market reacts
negatively when an internal manager is promoted  as this manager may be held partially
responsible for past poor performance
In companies with good past performance and with internal succession, there is a price
decline from day –5 to +4, but this is not statistically significant (figure 2b). External
succession in companies with a good performance track record, share prices decline
significantly from day –12 and after the announcement, the cumulative abnormal returns
levels off (figure 2a). It should be noted that the number of events is small, but that these
                                                       
7 An promotion is defined as being external if the new CEO was neither employed by the company nor serves on
the firm’s board of directors at least one year prior to the promotion. Good and poor performance is defined as,
respectively, above and below the median of the return on equity (ROE) corrected for the average industry ROE
and taken over the year prior to the turnover. The findings are robust to the other definitions of performance
described in section 2.
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findings are not incongruent with proposal 5b which states that turnover in well performing
companies induces a loss of human capital which is stronger when the new CEO is external to
the company.
Figures 3a and 3b show the abnormal returns of an 80-day event window around the
announcement of the promotion of an internal and external CEO respectively, in small and
large companies. Internal succession coinciding with non-conflictual turnover may cause
weaker (negative) reactions in larger companies than in smaller ones because the former
usually have a pool of potential successors. Figure 3a corroborates proposal 6a: in small firms
a significant negative market reaction of –7.34% takes place over the period day –2 to +3. If
past poor performance has led to CEO removal, the nomination of an new external CEO may
cause larger positive market reactions in smaller companies as it is easier to turn around or
redirect the strategy of such firms. Figure 3b does not support proposition 6b as abnormal
returns decline prior to the event data and continue to decline in the three weeks subsequent
to the event.
If the company is diversified and operates in several unrelated industries, the value of the
human capital of a new top manager can be assessed with less precision than in undiversified
companies. Hence, external succession may trigger a higher positive price reaction8 in a
diversified company as the value added by an external manager may be higher than in non-
diversified firms. Proposal 7 is not supported by our evidence.
 [INSERT FIGURES 2A AND 2B, 3A AND 3B ABOUT HERE]
3.3. Share price reaction model.
Table 4 shows the relation between the cumulative annual average abnormal return in a 20-
day event window at the announcement of CEO departure, and corporate size, past
performance (industry corrected Return on Equity), degree of corporate diversification, type
of CEO resignation (forced or voluntary) and origin of the CEO successor (internal or
external). The explanatory variables in this cross-sectional regression explain a large
proportion (48.6%) of the total variation in share price reactions. Past performance, forced
departure and the interaction terms of performance and background of the new CEO (internal
or external nomination) are statistically significant (within the 5% level).
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In the case of a forced resignation by the incumbent CEO (resignation dummy=1) and of poor
past performance (e.g. industry-corrected ROE of –10%), a positive price reaction of 2.9% is
expected since the negative performance effect of –1.4% (βi2) is more than compensated by
the positive effect of the forced turnover with 4.3% (βi5). Hence, this evidence supports
proposition 1 which states that a positive price reaction is expected when the CEO is forced to
leave when performance was poor. The positive price reaction increases by a further 1%9 (βi8)
at the announcement of an external successor (succession dummy=1), which supports
proposition 5a. When the CEO resigns voluntary (resignation dummy=0), is succeeded by an
internal manager (succession dummy=0) and industry-corrected past return on equity was
positive (e.g. 10%), a positive price reaction of 13.7% is obtained. This does not corroborate
proposition 2. However, this positive price reaction is sharply adjusted downwards to 3.7% if
the voluntary departing CEO (after past good performance) is succeeded by an external
manager. This may reflect the loss of human capital, as proposition 4 states.
Propositions 6 and 7 which predict a relation between share price reactions and corporate size
and the degree of corporate diversification are not sustained. Substituting industry-corrected
ROE in the regression of table 4 by the Treynor ratio and Tobin’s Q only yielded significant
results similar to the ones presented in table 4 for the Treynor ratio. Substituting market
capitalisation by total assets, number of employees, total sales did not have an impact on the
results.
4. A CEO disciplining model.
Panel A of Table 5 exhibits the ownership structure and concentration for the sample of 325
listed companies. Panel A shows that industrial and commercial companies are the largest
category of owners with an average of 22.2%. The combined direct ownership concentration
of institutions – banks, investment and pension funds and insurance companies – amounts to
20.2% whereas holding companies own an average of 16.9%. Similar to Germany (Boehmer
1999) and Belgium (Renneboog 2000), ownership structure is typically complex with stakes
held through multiple tiers of ownership. Hence, control is with ultimate shareholders who
control either directly or indirectly via affiliated companies, a large percentage of the voting
rights. We define a relation between an ultimate shareholder and a target company as a control
                                                                                                                                                                            
8 Price reactions will be less strongly negative after non-conflictual turnover and less strongly positive after
conflictual turnover.
9 A beta of –0.1 multiplied a negative performance of –10% and the succession dummy of 1.
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relation if (i) there is a series of uninterrupted majority shareholdings on every ownership tier
throughout the pyramid or (ii) if there is a large shareholding of at least 25 percent on every
ownership level in the absence of other shareholders with stakes of blocking minority size or
larger. Panel B shows the ownership concentration based on direct and indirect control
relations: the ownership percentages are reclassified based on the shareholder category of the
ultimate owner who directly or indirectly controls these direct share stakes. Comparing panels
A and B, the most remarkable change is that the government directly and indirectly controls
13.1% of the direct equity stakes of our sample companies. Panel B also show that families and
directors often use intermediate investment vehicles to own share stakes. In the average
company, the largest shareholder holds a majority stake of 52.3% (median of 51.3%), or of
53.9% (median of 53.4%) if those direct shareholdings directly and indirectly controlled by the
same ultimate shareholder are summed (panels C and D). This stands in stark contrast with the
UK where a coalition of the 5 largest shareholders typical owns only 40% of the shares (or
voting rights). The second and third largest shareholder have typically no influence on how the
company is run. In the highest ownership concentration quartile, the largest shareholder even
has a supermajority of 75%.
In table 6, we investigate whether conflictual CEO removal resulting from poor corporate
performance is caused by large shareholder activism or is facilitated by an efficient board
structure. Past performance is measured both by lagged market corrected share price
performance, Tobin’s Q, levels and changes of return on equity (earnings after tax) and levels
and changes of return on assets (operating earnings). Although there is strong evidence of
performance-related top management disciplining in the US (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991),
UK (Franks et al. 1998), Japan (Kaplan and Minton 1994) and Belgium (Renneboog 2000),
there seems to be no consistent relation for the sample of French companies between past
performance and forced CEO departures. Neither the performance terms shown in table 6 nor
the interaction terms between performance and the disciplinary mechanisms (not shown) are
statistically significant.
As ownership is strongly concentrated in France with the largest shareholder controlling a
majority in the average company, board restructuring is expected to be initiated by this
shareholder (such as holding companies, industrial companies). However, executive directors
owning major share stakes may impede board restructuring. Institutional investors (banks,
pension/investment funds, insurance companies) are not expected to monitor if they intend to
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safeguard portfolio liquidity and to avoid transgressing the insider trading regulation.
Proposition 8 is upheld by the findings of table 6. The presence of a holding company in the
ownership structure is positively correlated with the probability of a forced CEO resignation.
However, it is questionable whether the large holding companies do discipline poorly
performing CEOs because the interaction terms of performance and ownership by holding
companies is not statistically significant. Thus, in the wake of poor performance, holding
companies do not seem to be instrumental in removing the incumbent CEO. Banerjee et al.
(1997) and Renneboog (2000) found no evidence was found for respectively French and
Belgian holding companies of wealth creation.
Table 6 also shows that the probability of forced CEO turnover increases when industrial
companies own substantial shareholdings. The fact that the interactive terms of industrial
ownership with performance is statistically significant (10% level) suggests that industrial
companies assume a corporate governance role. It should be noted that the relation between
CEO disciplining and ownership was only found after classifying the share stakes on the basis
of the identity of the ultimate shareholders who control tier 1 directly or indirectly. Including
only the direct shareholdings (by category of owner at the direct ownership level) did not
yield any results. This supports proposition 9 which states that corporate governance actions
are undertaken by ultimate shareholders rather than by the owners at the direct level. Table 6
also shows that banks or institutions do not partake in managerial disciplining. Furthermore,
although many companies are (indirectly) controlled by the government, there is not evidence
of performance-related corporate governance actions in these companies.
All in all, the relation between ownership concentration and disciplining is, at best, weak. The
reason may be that much of shareholder monitoring and corporate governance actions is
undertaken by shareholder representatives on the board of directors. To capture the board
characteristics, the percentage of non-executive directors on the board is included as well as
the percentage of directors representing the large shareholders, creditors and founding family.
In line with in US and Belgian findings (Weisbach 1988, Renneboog 2000) but in contrast to
UK findings (Faccio and Lasfer 1999, Franks et al. 1998), table 6 shows that the higher the
percentage of independent directors, the higher the probability of forced CEO turnover. There
is also strong evidence that in companies with a high percentage of the non-executive
directors representing the shareholders a higher probability forced CEO is to be expected.
Still, less forced CEO turnover is taking place when the board also comprises directors
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representing the founding family. This may result from the fact that these founding families
are trying to defend the private benefits they derive from their (executive) positions on the
board.10 No relation was discovered between capital gearing and forced turnover, although a
creditor’s influence may be captured by the percentage of directors representing shareholders
which is strongly correlated with forced CEO departure. Finally, there is evidence that forced
CEO turnover occurs more frequently in smaller companies.
[INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE]
5. Conclusions.
This study has analysed the share price reactions to changes in top management. A distinction
was made among different types of CEO turnover: forced resignation, voluntary departures
and age-related retirements. The announcement of a forced CEO resignation is hailed
favourably by the market with a small but significantly positive abnormal return of 0.5%. The
market may have anticipated the forced turnover since the abnormal return over a one-month
period prior to the turnover amounts to 6%. Whereas voluntary resignations do not cause a
price reactions, age-related turnover triggers a small negative price reaction. Subsequently, a
more detailed classification of the change of top management was made based on the
background of the successor (an internal versus external candidate), on the size of the
corporation and the degree of corporate diversification. Expectedly, the nomination of an
external manager following the performance-related forced resignation of a CEO causes a
strong increase in abnormal returns of more than 2%. The cumulative abnormal return of an
internal CEO promotion in a poorly performing firms drops by almost 1% on the day of the
announcement. Presumably, this is because the internal manager is held (partially)
responsible for past poor performance. In companies with good past performance and with
internal succession, there is a price decline, but this is not statistically significant.
The paper also analysed which corporate governance mechanisms are responsible for forced
CEO turnover. A logit regression which accounted for time and industry specific fixed effects
did not reveal a relation between performance and turnover. Furthermore, institutional
investors, banks and the government do not seem to provoke CEO departures even if they
own large blocks of equity. The institutions may not be interested in influencing corporate
policy or taking corporate control actions (like the disciplining of top management) as they
may end of with market sensitive private information. This might immobilise their share
                                                       
10 Whereas the shareholder and creditor representatives are non-executive directors, our data do not show
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participations as they must avoid violating insider trading regulation. The monitoring
inactivity of banks may be explained by conflicts of interest between their position as creditor
and equity holder. The problems with Credit Lyonnais suggest a laissez faire mentality on the
government’s part as the intervention was late by many years. We did not find evidence that
the government exerts control in the companies in which it holds majority shareholdings. In
contrast, when industrial companies are major owners, there is evidence that forced turnover
is facilitated. It seems that it is easier to remove management in smaller companies than in
larger ones. On the part of holding companies, there is only some evidence that they take a
monitoring role in the case of other listed holding companies. No correlation was discovered
between the degree of leverage and forced CEOs departures, although CEO turnover is
facilitated if creditors have their own representatives on the board. Likewise, a high
proportion of shareholder representatives on the board leads to a higher probability of forced
CEO resignations. However, this probability decreases when the founding family is
represented by one or more (executive) directors.
                                                                                                                                                                            
whether a founder representative is executive or non-executive director.
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Table 1 : Reasons for CEO’s resignations and their destinations.
% Number
Number of companies with CEO change 207
Number of changes of CEO 277
Only CEO leaves 62% 172
CEO and part of management team leaves 38% 105
Reasons for resignation: Reason mentioned in financial
press
Reason mentioned in database
of BdF
% Numb. of cases % Number of cases
Age related retirement 17% 21 3% 8
Death 4% 5 3% 6
Illness 3% 4 - -
Personal reasons 13% 17 - -
Non-renewal of contract - - 7% 17
Dismissal - - 72% 175
Change in the company’s acts of incorporation 1% 1 4% 10
Other professional opportunity 7% 9 - -
Conflict with shareholders, board or management 10% 13 1% 3
Merger 1% 2
No reason given 45% 58 9% 21
Total 100% 128 100% 242
% Number of cases Average age CEO Tenure
Forced departures (1) 40 37 60 4.5
Non-conflictual resignations (2) 37 34 59 8
Age-related retirements (3) 23 21 66 7
Total 100 92 61 6.5
Destination of CEO after resignation: % Number of cases
Remains in the same company 49% 61
Leaves for firm of the same corporate group 12% 15
Moves to other (non-related) firm 39% 48
100% 124
Resigning CEO becomes: % Number of cases
CEO of another company 34% 96
Honorary chairman in old company 31% 87
(1) Departures are considered as forced resignations: (a) if the financial press alludes to a conflict with shareholders, or
the board of directors (13 cases), (b) if the press does not specify the reason but the database of the Banque de
France mentions the non-renewal of contracts (13 cases), (c) if the financial press mentions ‘personal reasons’ but
the Banque de France specifies a case of non-renewal of the contract (11 cases).
(2) Departure is considered non-conflictual: (a) if the financial press or the Banque de France report a death (6 cases),
(b) if the press indicates that the CEO for reasons of illness (4 cases), (c) if there was another professional
opportunity (9 cases), (d) if the CEO invoked personal reasons, excluding the non-renewal of contracts (15 cases).
(3) The departure is accepted as a retirement if the CEO reaches the age limit or retirement age.
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Table 2 : Share price reaction model.
Panel A : Explanation of price reactions following CEO substitution.
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Expected
sign
Proposition
(Price Reaction)i = αi+ βi1 corporate size + (6)
+ βi2 corporate performance - (1)
+ βi3 sector homogeneity of the firm + (7)
+ βi4 successor’s origin (1=external) + 5a
+ βi5 type of resignation (1=forced) + 4
+ βi6 corporate performance * type of resignation - 1
+ βi7 size * successor’s origin + 6
+ βi8 corporate performance * successor’s origin - 5b
+ βi9 sector homogeneity * successor’s origin + 7
+ εi.






Yes Internal (Price reaction)i = (αi+βi5) + βi1 * Size + (βi2+βi6) * Performance + βi3 *
Homogeneity + εI
Yes External (Price reaction)i =  (αi+βi4+βi5)+ (βi1+βi7) * Size + (βi2+βi6+βi8) * Performance +
(βi3+ βi9) * Homogeneity + εI
No Internal (Price reaction)i = αi + βi1* Size + βi2 * Performance + βi3 * Homogeneity + εi
No External (Price reaction)i = (αI+βi4) + (βi1+βi7) * Size + (βi2+βi8) * Performance + (βi3+βi9)
* Homogeneity + εI
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Table 3: Market price reactions and the announcement of CEO
resignations.
This table shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) of specific time windows
around the announcement of non-conflictual resignations (panel A) of forced dismissals (panel
B) and of age related retirements (panel C). Panel D shows the difference in returns of non-
conflictual versus forced turnover. Day 0 is the announcement date of the resignation; -5 to 5
stands for an event window of 11 days from five days (-5) prior to the announcement day to five
days subsequent to day 0. Source: own calculations.
Event Window (Days) Observations CAARs Student T-stat p-value
Panel A: Announcement of non-conflictual resignation.
0 34 0.003 0.388 0.704
-1 to 0 0.005 0.405 0.692
-2 to 2 -0.009 -0.395 0.700
-5 to 5 0.000 -0.001 1.000
-10 to 10 0.011 -0.537 0.600
-60 to -1 -0.054 -0.978 0.378
-60 to 30 -0.061 -0.974 0.359
Panel B: Announcement of forced resignation.
0 37 0.005 0.782 0.454
-1 to 0 0.004 0.455 0.660
-2 to 2 0.060 0.313 0.761
-5 to 5 0.016 1.001 0.343
-10 to 10 0.046 2.953 0.016**
-60 to -1 0.057 1.355 0.213
-60 to 30 0.079 1.261 0.243
Panel C: Announcement of retirement.
0 21 0.000 0.102 0.921
-1 to 0 0.000 -0.043 0.966
-2 to 2 -0.003 -0.604 0.557
-5 to 5 -0.016 -2.392 0.034**
-10 to 10 0.002 0.070 0.946
-60 to -1 0.010 0.267 0.795
-60 to 30 0.046 0.848 0.418
Panel D : Difference in returns: voluntary versus forced resignation.
Difference Student t-stat Student t-stat p-value
In means (equal σ2) (unequal σ2)
0 0.002 0.214 0.202 0.833
-1 to 0 -0.001 -0.060 0.055 0.690
-2 to 2 0.069 0.503 0.477 0.620
-5 to 5 0.016 0.500 0.449 0.622
-10 to 10 0.035 2.191 2.031 0.039**
-60 to -1 0.111 1.536 1.437 0.142
-60 to 30 0.14 1.580 1.580 0.134
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Table 4 : Results of the share price reaction model.
Dependent var.: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return over day –10 and +10
(0 is announcement of CEO turnover)
Independ.
variables








αi βi1 βi2 βi3 βi4 βi5 βi6 βi7 βi8 βi9
Coefficients -0.029 -0.009 0.137** -0.359 -0.088 0.043** -0.049 0.007 -0.100** 0.764
t-stat. -0.468 -1.100 2.474 -0.845 -1.189 2.355 -0.991 0.815 -2.256 1.480
p-value 0.645 0.285 0.023 0.408 0.249 0.029 0.334 0.425 0.036 0.155
R2 adjusted : 0.486
F-test : 3.947 ***
Autocor. residuals (Durban Watson): 0.075; p-value (1.730)
Sample size : 92
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in both regressions indicates that the normality hypothesis of the residuals cannot be
rejected: the significance tests are valid
Notes:
RESIGN = resignation: equals 1 in case of forced resignation and 0 in case of voluntary resignation. Age-related
retirements are excluded from the sample.
ORIGIN = origin of the successor: equals 1 if the new CEO is external (was not previously employed by the firm or was
employed for maximally 1 year) or 0 if the CEO is internal.
SIZE = corporate size measured by the logarithm of the market capitalisation.
PERFORM = performance measured by the change in ROE corrected for industry ROE in the year prior to the CEO
substitution.
HOM = sector homogeneity of the firm measured by the correlation between the share price return of the firm and the
return of the industrial sector.
***, ** and * stand for the significance at respectively 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table 5 : Ownership concentration by category of owner.
This table shows the descriptive statistics of ownership concentration for 11 categories of owner. Panel A
classifies the direct shareholdings whereas in panel B the direct shareholdings are (re)classified based on the
category of shareholder who ultimately controls (directly or indirectly by means of a cascade of intermediary
shareholdings) the voting rights. The average size of the largest shareholdings is presented in panels C and D
which respectively focus on direct and on direct and indirect voting right concentration. Source: own calculations.
Number of observations: 325 companies in 1992
Mean Standard
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis Median 75%
quartile
Maximum
Panel A : Concentration of direct shareholdings by category of owner
Holding companies 16.9% 28.4% 1.63 1.41 0.0% 20.0% 99.9%
Banks 9.0% 22.8% 2.84 7.09 0.0% 3.4% 100.0%
Insurance companies 6.7% 20.0% 3.25 9.56 0.0% 0.0% 95.1%
Investment/pension funds 4.5% 15.1% 4.38 20.52 0.0% 0.0% 99.5%
Industrial and commercial co’s 22.2% 32.5% 1.21 -0.01 0.0% 44.7% 99.4%
Individuals and families 0.2% 1.3% 6.09 38.42 0.0% 0.0% 10.0%
Government stakes 2.1% 10.9% 5.73 32.39 0.0% 0.0% 79.4%
Real estate firms 1.1% 7.3% 7.69 62.75 0.0% 0.0% 74.3%
Executive directors 1.8% 7.9% 5.04 26.20 0.0% 0.0% 57.9%
Non-executive directors 1.0% 5.1% 7.41 62.51 0.0% 0.0% 52.1%
Personnel 0.1% 0.5% 10.18 110.61 0.0% 0.0% 5.6%
Panel B : Concentration of direct and indirect shareholdings by category of owner
Holding companies 14.9% 28.4% 1.82 1.99 0.0% 10.2% 99.9%
Banks 7.5% 20.8% 3.23 9.75 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Insurance companies 2.4% 12.1% 6.26 40.43 0.0% 0.0% 97.1%
Investment/pension funds 3.6% 13.1% 4.84 26.07 0.0% 0.0% 98.9%
Industrial and commercial co’s 14.8% 28.6% 1.85 2.02 0.0% 11.3% 99.4%
Individuals and families 2.9% 13.1% 5.41 30.55 0.0% 0.0% 99.3%
Government stakes 13.1% 26.3% 1.99 2.63 0.0% 10.0% 99.4%
Real estate firms 0.7% 6.2% 9.95 105.82 0.0% 0.0% 74.3%
Executive directors 3.9% 13.9% 3.87 15.26 0.0% 0.0% 92.0%
Non-executive directors 1.3% 6.5% 6.65 47.70 0.0% 0.0% 59.7%
Personnel 0.4% 4.8% 12.60 161.94 0.0% 0.0% 66.7%
Panel C : Largest direct shareholdings
Largest 52.3% 28.9% -0.04 -0.87 51.3% 72.3% 100.0%
2nd largest 8.2% 9.9% 1.38 1.69 5.5% 12.4% 48.8%
3th largest 3.0% 4.6% 1.56 1.96 0.0% 5.4% 21.0%
4th largest 1.3% 2.8% 2.41 5.65 0.0% 0.0% 15.6%
5th largest 0.7% 2.6% 9.15 118.05 0.0% 0.0% 36.8%
6th largest 0.2% 0.9% 4.87 24.05 0.0% 0.0% 6.7%
7th largest 0.0% 0.3% 15.33 246.66 0.0% 0.0% 5.0%
Panel D: Largest shareholdings (direct and indirect stakes combined)
Largest 53.9% 29.0% -0.15 -0.86 53.4% 75.2% 100.0%
2nd largest 7.4% 9.7% 1.57 2.36 4.7% 11.0% 48.8%
3th largest 2.4% 4.1% 1.82 3.03 0.0% 4.7% 19.3%
4th largest 1.1% 2.7% 2.76 7.98 0.0% 0.0% 15.6%
5th largest 0.6% 2.5% 9.71 127.80 0.0% 0.0% 36.8%
6th largest 0.2% 0.8% 5.50 31.37 0.0% 0.0% 6.7%
7th largest 0.0% 0.3% 15.33 246.66 0.0% 0.0% 5.0%
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Table 6: Conflictual CEO turnover, performance, ownership concentration and board composition.
This table shows a logit model estimating the probability of CEO turnover (dummy=1) and its relation with past performance,
as measured by Tobin’s Q, share price returns, return on earnings and return on assets. Source: own calculations.
Sample size 373 297 374 374 369
CEO turnover 314 253 315 315 312





Changes in ROE ROA (average t-1,
t-2)
Changes in ROA
Par. Estim. p-value Par. Estim. p-value Par. Estim. p-value Par. Estim. p-value Par. Estim. p-value
Intercept 6.5644** 0.02 9.5768** 0.03 6.6261** 0.02 6.6277** 0.02 7.8566*** 0.01
Performance t-1 -0.3236 0.40 -0.1943 0.75 -0.5747 0.17 -1.2296 0.43 -0.8567 0.66
Performance t-2 -0.1518 0.81 0.1696 0.53 2.1926 0.19
Ownership stake of the largest shareholder by class of ownership:
Holding companies 2.1057** 0.04 3.9408*** 0.00 2.4564** 0.02 2.1698** 0.04 2.2141** 0.04
Banks -2.5657 0.55 -2.6193 0.59 -3.0829 0.51 -2.8765 0.50 -2.99 0.49
Institutions 0.6952 0.66 1.5283 0.37 1.5361 0.30 0.7629 0.62 0.582 0.73
Industrial companies 1.9724** 0.04 1.1691 0.34 2.2643** 0.02 2.055** 0.03 1.8602* 0.06
Families and individ. -0.5573 0.81 0.2477 0.93 0.1844 0.94 -0.5087 0.83 0.0599 0.98
Government 1.0725 0.37 2.7501* 0.06 1.6489 0.17 1.1091 0.35 1.1509 0.34
Executives 1.4179 0.49 -3.3006 0.38 1.1885 0.56 1.4814 0.48 2.1398 0.30
Non-executives 3.484 0.14 4.1015* 0.10 3.6471 0.11 3.7056 0.11 4.3288* 0.09




0.0463** 0.03 0.0586** 0.02 0.0458** 0.02 0.0501** 0.02 0.0412* 0.06
Directors represent.
Debtholders (%)
0.0405*** 0.00 0.0415*** 0.01 0.0426*** 0.00 0.0387*** 0.00 0.0407*** 0.00
Directors represent.
founders (%)
-0.0457* 0.08 -0.0324 0.25 -0.0362* 0.10 -0.0484* 0.06 -0.0469* 0.07
% Non-executive
directors
0.0662** 0.02 0.109** 0.02 0.064** 0.02 0.0683** 0.02 0.0793*** 0.01
CEO=Chairman (=1) -0.2196 0.86 -1.543 0.25 -0.1863 0.88 -0.2397 0.84 -0.3703 0.76
Corporate characteristics:
Leverage -0.0932 0.94 0.6563 0.69 0.2891 0.82 0.0987 0.94 0.4064 0.76
Size (ln of sales) -0.1627*** 0.01 -0.2166*** 0.01 -0.1721*** 0.01 -0.1625*** 0.01 -0.143** 0.03
Legal form -0.7602 0.56 -2.6017* 0.09 -0.7386 0.57 -0.9103 0.49 -1.0411 0.44
Type of exchange -0.1498 0.70 0.2357 0.59 -0.1824 0.63 -0.203 0.59 -0.2506 0.55
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
-2 Log Likelihood 0.0028 0.0001 0.0026 0.0028 0.0013
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Figure 3b : Wealth effects subsequent to external CEO succession in small and large
poorly performing companies.
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